Case 21: Suffolk County, NY
Non-Minority Suffolk Officers Appeal to Court for Relief from Reverse Discrimination (Filed Feb. 9, 2001)

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Law firm Rubin and Purcell filed the following brief on Feb. 9, 2001 on behalf of Suffolk County Police Officers who are challenging the 1999 Suffolk County Police Examination.  This 2/9/01 brief was filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  In this brief, plaintiffs are seeking to reverse the decision of the District Court and remand the action for further proceedings at the trial level.

3. Appeal by Plaintiffs

Legal Brief by Non-Minority Suffolk County Officers to Appeals Court
(Filed 02/09/01)


          This civil action was commenced by Plaintiffs-Appellants on May 17, 2000 in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Suffolk, as a proceeding pursuant to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules Article 78, challenging the selection device (civil service examination) utilized by Suffolk County in 1999 for filling police officer positions within the County. On that date, Justice Robert Lifson granted an application by Plaintiffs-Appellants brought on by Order to Show Cause, seeking a Temporary Restraining Order, prohibiting the County of Suffolk from hiring any police officers from a list of applicants compiled as a result of the Suffolk County 1999 civil service examination, and ordered a hearing for May 22, 2000.

          On May 19, 2000, Defendants-Appellees, Alan Schneider and Suffolk County, filed a Notice of Removal in the United States District Court, Eastern District to remove the action from state court to federal court. On May 22, 2000, said Notice of Removal was filed in state court. On June 7, 2000, Defendants-Appellees, Alan Schneider and Suffolk County, filed a Verified Answer. On June 19, 2000, Plaintiffs-Appellants formally moved to remand the action to state court.

          On June 27, 2000, Plaintiffs-Appellants filed an Amended and Supplemental Petition in District Court. On June 20, 2000, the United States of America intervened as a party defendant. On June 29, 2000, Defendants-Appellees, Alan Schneider and Suffolk County, filed a motion to vacate the Temporary Restraining Order. By Order dated July, 28, 2000, the United States District Court denied Plaintiffs-Appellants' motion to remand and found moot Appellees' motion to vacate the Temporary Restraining Order.

          On August 25, 2000, Defendants-Appellees filed a joint motion, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss the Amended and Supplemental Petition. By Memorandum and Order dated September 19, 2000, the United States District Court granted Defendants-Appellees joint motion to dismiss the Amended and Supplemental Petition. A Judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellees dismissing said Amended and Supplemental Petition was signed by the Clerk of the District Court on September 26, 2000 and entered on September 27, 2000. Notice of Entry of the Memorandum and Order, dated September 19, 2000, was served upon counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants via regular mail on October 5, 2000.

          As the Memorandum and Order, together with the Judgment, formed a final disposition of this matter, Plaintiffs-Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal with the District Court on October 19, 2000, as of right and within the time limitations set forth in Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.



1.  Whether there is any enforceable standard of merit and fitness under a Title VII job qualification standard?

2.  Whether the Amended Petition Alleged Violations of Article V, Section 6 of the New York State Constitution, Section 50(6) of the New York Civil Service Law, or the Suffolk County Code standards of merit and fitness?

3.  Whether New York State standards of merit and fitness purport to require or permit discriminatory employment practices, as defined in federal law, so as to preclude a hearing, as to whether the selection device employed by the County of Suffolk for police officer positions is "unduly abstract" and/or non-predictive of job qualifications?

4.  Should a hearing have been ordered prior to the decision on the underlying motion as to whether the non-cognitive selection methods utilized by Defendants-Appellees were "unduly abstract", or failed to be proper indicia of job qualification or proper predictors of job performance?

5.  Whether the use of "unduly abstract" questions, forming the basis for ranking of job applicants, raises a triable issue under federal, state and local law?

6.  Whether combat era veteran preferences merits the type of protection extended under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, as rights that are "essential attributes of national citizenship"?

7.  Whether there is a level of danger to the public safety under the Tenth Amendment created by the use of "unduly abstract" selection devices for law enforcement positions?



          Plaintiffs-Appellants brought this action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, alleging that the 1999 Suffolk County Police Examination was neither prepared, administered or graded in accord with Article V, Section 6 of the New York State Constitution, Section 50(6) of the New York State Civil Service Law, and the Suffolk County Code.

Plaintiffs-Appellants contend that:

a.  The selection device designed, implemented and graded by S.H.L. Landy Jacobs, Inc., a private testing company, for the hire of police officers in Suffolk County contained "unduly abstract" questions which failed to provide a valid measure of applicants relative ability to discharge the duties of the service into which they seek to be appointed;

b.  The grading lists were altered when it was determined that, after the inclusion of a substantial number of cognitive questions in the examination, small numbers of minority candidates were found in the top levels.

c.  The weight given to answers of "unduly abstract" questions was increased over and against answers to cognitive answers, after it was determined that the grading list contained small numbers of minority candidates in the top levels;

d. State and County civil service laws were specifically waived by the Consent Order of 1987 (A. 39) with respect to the County's interim use of the Richardson Bellows Henry ("RBH") selection device only, and not with respect to the selection device in question; and

e.  Alan Schneider, Personnel Officer of the County of Suffolk, has failed to employ his power to correct, amend or revoke the eligible list in accordance with the Suffolk County Code.

f.  The District Court erred in dismissing the Amended Verified Petition absent allowing the parties any discovery or having a proper hearing on the merits.



          The underlying proceeding was brought by Plaintiffs-Appellants based on their contention that Appellees are in violation of various sections of the New York State Constitution, New York Civil Service Law and Suffolk County Code. Plaintiffs-Appellants allege that: (1) Appellees have failed to certify that the 1999 Suffolk County civil service examination for police officers, as graded, was either practical in its character and related to those matters which fairly test capacity and fitness of the persons examined to discharge the duties of that service into which they sought to be appointed, or whether it was not such a merit based and graded examination; (2) the 1999 Suffolk County civil service exam for police officers is not competitive under statutory measure, not constitutional and not valid under standards for use of non-cognitive data in employee selection; and (3) Appellees manipulated the 1999 Suffolk County civil service exam for police officers test questions and answers to achieve specific results, disregarding mandatory State constitutional and statutory merit and fitness requirements for police officer positions, endangering public safety, and violating Plaintiffs-Appellants' rights to a competitive civil service examination.

          Plaintiffs-Appellants are individuals who took the 1999 Suffolk County Civil Service Examination for Police Officers, after having paid a $100 mandatory fee to Suffolk County Department of Civil Service. (A. 71-72). In many cases, Plaintiffs-Appellants purchased materials or paid to attend courses to prepare for the examination. The examination was designed and graded by S.H.L. Landy Jacobs, Inc., a private testing company. (A. 87, 134). It originally included many cognitive questions, as well as various "unduly abstract" psychological questions. (A. 71-81).

          Test results were mailed to Plaintiffs-Appellants in March 2000. Of the approximately 27,000 individuals who took said examination, none of the Plaintiffs-Appellants scored in the first band or in the upper part of the second band and have not been selected to advance to the secondary level of screening. A majority of Plaintiffs-Appellants are presently law enforcement officers, many serving as police officers, detectives, sergeants and lieutenants in the New York City Police Department, as Deputy Sheriffs in the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department or as Town or Village Police Officers. These are experienced, highly regarded law enforcement officers, many of whom are college educated, and recipients of commendations. They have universally obtained extremely high scores on previous civil service examinations. (A. 71-81).

          It is alleged by Plaintiffs-Appellants, that Appellees engaged in the manipulation of the testing, rating and scoring of the 1999 Selection Device. It is further alleged that such actions violate the Constitution of the State of New York, New York Civil Service Law, Suffolk County Code, the Consent Decrees of this Court (A. 39-70).



          The Second Circuit stated in Kirkland v. New York State Department of Correctional Services., 520 F.2d 420, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1975) that an attack on civil service examinations heralds future confrontations between the advocates of equal opportunities and the supporters of our civil service system. This Court indicated that:

"...the judiciary should act with great reluctance in undermining traditional civil service concepts; and, if a decision is to be made to subordinate the social purposes of civil service to those of equal employment opportunity, that decision should be made by the people speaking through their legislators."

          Kirkland, supra, 520 F.2d at 429. Federalism concerns make it appropriate for Congress to speak clearly when it regulates state action. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000). In Kimel, 528 U.S. at 94-95, Justice Stevens indicated that: "Congress can use its broad range of flexible legislative tools to approach the delicate issue of how to balance local and national interests in the most responsive and careful manner."

          Moreover, in a concurring opinion in Rutan v Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 80, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 2740, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990), Justice Stevens reiterated a point he had first made as a Circuit Judge:

"Neither this court nor any other may impose a civil service system upon the State of Illinois. The General Assembly has provided an elaborate system regulating the appointment to specified positions solely on the basis of merit and fitness....A federal court has no power to establish any such employment code."

          Appellees, herein, in a misguided effort to enforce Title VII, have indeed imposed a national civil service system upon Suffolk County and disregarded New York State's merit and fitness requirements as a basis for hiring. Such adverse behavior was specifically addressed by Senators Case and Clifford in 1964, co-managers of the Senate bill on Title VII, who stated:

"Title VII expressly protects the employer's right to insist that any prospective applicant, Negro or white, must meet the applicable job qualifications. Indeed, the very purpose of Title VII is to promote hiring on the basis of job qualifications, rather than on the basis of race or color."

          110 Congressional Record 7213, 7247 (1964); quoted in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1787, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989); cited in Taxman v. Board of Education of Township of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3rd Cir. 1996), 519 U.S. 1089, cert. granted, 117 S.Ct. 763), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1010, 118 S.Ct. 595. Nevertheless, the United States Justice Department has taken it upon itself, through imposition of unsupervised "consent decrees" with municipalities, to abolish the protections of civil service in over two hundred municipalities across the country. The instant appeal speaks to harm which has ensued throughout the country, and specifically Suffolk County, and which should be redressed by the courts. This includes the violation of state constitutional law, state Civil Service Law, County Code Civil Service protections, violations of veterans rights to preference on open and competitive civil service exams, the danger to the public safety under the Tenth Amendment and the violation of state consumer law by deceptive advertising which purports to announce open and competitive civil service examinations for selection devices, which are, in fact, nothing more than lotteries implemented to defray allegations of discriminatory intent or impact.

          The instant Suffolk County police officer "selection device" purportedly guaranteed equality for all candidates. However, in reality the examination did not test the skills and qualifications necessary for the position of police officer. This, the Supreme Court found, is contrary to Congress' intent. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430, 91 S.Ct. 849, 853, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). The courts have long recognized the risk to public safety of hiring incompetent firefighters or police officers. Zamlen v. City of Cleveland, 906 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936, 111 S.Ct. 1388, 113 L.Ed.2d 444 (1991). As Judge Sofaer found twenty years ago, petitioners have a right to prove to the court that a selection device such as this will be meaningless in ascertaining cognitive abilities and job qualification. Vulcan Society of Westchester County, Inc. v. Fire Department of White Plains, 505 F.Supp. 955, 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). However, the District Court herein utterly refused to permit an examination of the Suffolk County selection device, abdicating all oversight to the Department of Justice. Essentially, the judiciary has conferred its enforcement powers upon a body appointed by the executive branch. This violates the doctrine of separation of powers and should be deemed unconstitutional.

          In this case, the Appellees have now used this device for ranking and hiring. The examination has not been demonstrated in any court to be valid as even a qualifying standard, much less a ranking device. At a hearing, the instant selection device would never survive the scrutiny given open and competitive civil service examinations for use as a ranking mechanism. How, then, are the Appellees able to rank candidates on the basis of this selection device, abolishing civil service protections without subjecting their mechanism to court scrutiny of its efficacy? This Appeal raises these issues.





          The standard for dismissing a party's claims was set forth by this Court in Dangler v. New York City Off Track Betting Corp., 193 F.3d 130, 138 (2nd Cir. 1999), which held:

"We review these contentions under the familiar principles governing motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Such a dismissal is not warranted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957). In ruling on such a motion, the court is to look only to the allegations of the complaint and any documents attached to or incorporated by reference in the complaint, see, e.g., Newman & Schwartz v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 102 F.3d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1996), to assume all well-pleaded factual allegations to be true, and to view all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such allegations and documents in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see, e.g., Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 1996). Applying these principles to the complaint at issue here, we conclude that Dangler's First Amendment claims should not have been dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted."

          The District Court erred in finding that the Amended Petition herein does not allege facts supporting claims that would constitute a violation of federal, state, and local law, as well as the Consent Decree. In so ruling, the Court ignored the fact that the Petition alleges an illegal and fraudulent manipulation of test questions, and perhaps more importantly, test answers, to achieve specific results, disregarding mandatory merit and fitness requirements for the position of police officer.

          During the course of this litigation, Appellees have conceded that if these allegations of manipulation and fraud were true, such actions would violate the Consent Decree. The District Court, however, indicated that:

"Even if defendants, in a memorandum previously submitted to this Court, did suggest that the facts alleged, if true, might violate the Consent Decree, defendants most recent submission as well as the plain language of the Consent Decree itself lay to rest any doubt as to whether the current test violates the Consent Decree."  (A. 169).

          What the lower Court fails to recognize is that an intentional manipulation of test answers, which favors minority groups, by making the majority of their responses the correct answer to subjective questions, results in both disparate intent and impact. This would constitute a violation of the Consent Decree, as well as Title VII. Unlike in Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42 (2nd Cir. 1999), Appellants specifically allege the alteration or manipulation of examination answers after the initial grading of same.

          The Court has also failed to perceive that if the Appellees graded the examination in an outright fraudulent manner, as alleged in the Petition, surely this action would facially constitute a violation of the Consent Decree. (A. 43-44). But the Court has ruled that the Petition does not allege facts supporting this claim. In so ruling, it ignores the fact that the aforementioned allegations, if contained within the four-corners of the pleading, must be taken as true for the purpose of the motion. See, Still v. DeBuno, 101 F.3d 888, 891 (2d Cir. 1996). It cannot be said that Plaintiffs-Appellants are not entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of this specific claim. Thus, Plaintiffs-Appellants' allegation should have sufficed to defeat Appellees' motion. See, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).

          Additionally, the District Court found that discovery was not necessary as the Petition did not allege sufficient facts. By so ruling, it again ignored the specific allegation that the test answers (as well as questions) had been intentionally manipulated so as to cause the desired groups answers to be deemed the correct answers. (A. 25 at 10, A. 29 at 21). This factual allegation, if proved to be true, would certainly constitute a violation of the Consent Decree as well as Title VII. Only through discovery could the truth of these allegations be uncovered. It is significant to note that during the course of this litigation, Appellees have never denied these allegations. In the absence of a denial of the allegations supported by at least some factual proof, discovery should have been ordered by the District Court, in order for it to determine the validity of Plaintiffs-Appellants' allegations.




          In Guardians Association of New York v. Civil Service Commission, 630 F.2d 79, 100-101 (2nd Ct. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940, 101 S.Ct. 3083, 69 L.Ed.2d 954 (1981), the Second Circuit stated, "Permissible use of rank ordering requires a demonstration of such substantial test validity that it is reasonable to expect one or two point differences in scores to reflect differences in job performance." Discussion of that standard is absent from the District Court's opinion. It is submitted that this matter should be returned to the District Court for a full hearing on whether the selection device can be shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the job of Suffolk County Police Officer or qualification for the position.

          Cognitive ability tests have been demonstrated to be excellent predictors of performance for police and detectives in public service. Hirsch, Northrop & Schmidt, "Validity Generalization Results for Law Enforcement Occupations", Personnel Psychology (1986)(cited in Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law for United States of America v. The City of Torrance, No. CV 93-4142 (C.D. Cal. September 18, 1996)( USDJ Pfaelzer). Examinations which test cognitive skills measure reading, writing and reasoning abilities and are reliable and valid predictors of performance in law enforcement occupations.

          The New York State Constitution, Article V, Section 6; (1) Section 50(6) of the New York Civil Service Law; (2) and Section 580-1 of the Suffolk County Code (3), were enacted to ensure that civil service positions were to be filled, as far as practicable, using merit and fitness standards determined by open and competitive examinations. Rather than follow these standards, the Justice Department has endeavored to ignore merit based test scores, which would have accurately assessed Appellants' ability to perform the duties required of a police officer. Thus, rather than waiting for the people to speak through their legislators to abolish competitive civil service testing, the Justice Department has done it for them. Unfortunately, the District Court has rubber stamped this dubious direction for determining who is best qualified to be a Suffolk County police officer, by its unwillingness to enforce standards of job qualification or predicted job performance in the selection device, despite the clear intent of Congress.

          The District Court, in its opinion below, stated that the only type of allegations that would violate the Consent Decree are those that involve treating applicants differently on the basis of race or gender. (A. 171). Initially, the Plaintiffs-Appellants are and were prepared to demonstrate that the administration of the examination did just that. The District Court ignored this challenge by dismissing the Amended Petition without any hearing on the merits. Moreover, if one is to take the District Court's reasoning literally, then a lottery for these law enforcement positions is acceptable under the Consent Decree. This is inconsistent with the Second Circuit's standard that an examination must be "shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it is used." Vulcan Society of the New York City Fire Department Inc. v. Civil Service Commission, 490 F.2d 387 (2d. Cir. 1973).

          The District Court's opinion is also inconsistent with the Uniform Guidelines 28 C.F.R. 50.14(4)(E)   ("...selection procedures under such programs should be based upon the ability or relative ability to do the work."). In contrast to the District Court's opinion, the Circuit Court's Opinion in Vulcan, supra, and the Uniform Guidelines are each consistent with the New York Constitution, New York Civil Service Law and the Suffolk County Code, each mandating merit and fitness based hiring. These standards obviously have value in ensuring that law enforcement is conducted fairly and capably.

          Plaintiffs-Appellants raise the issue herein as to whether any standards of merit and fitness in hiring remain to be enforced by the courts. The decision below infers that lotteries are acceptable to the court so long as their social purpose is acceptable to the Justice Department. The selection device in issue has eliminated cognitive function measures from the substantive grading of the device. What particular measure of feelings or attitudes is reflected in the grading of the instant selection device is a mystery to but Appellees and S.H.L. Landy Jacobs, since no testimony was adduced by the Court below. Appellees use of the Consent Decree as a means to design and implement any type of examination they wish, without any scrutiny by the court or the public, has resulted in turning the Consent Decree into "an instrument of wrong." Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 215, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 2006, 138 L.Ed.2d. 391, 409 (1997). Appellees' entities have in effect "purchased from a court of equity a continuing injunction" substantively abolishing state merit and fitness standards, while depending upon the indifference of the federal court to shelter the entirely subjective nature of their "selection device". System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651, 81 S.Ct. 368, 373, 5 L.Ed.2d. 349, 355 (1961). This oversight furnished to the Department of Justice should be deemed as a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

          Thus, this entire matter should be remanded to the District Court for a full and formal hearing on the matter of the testing device that was designed, implemented, administered and graded by Appellees.




          In Suffolk County, the police officer is the first responder to all emergency calls. The Suffolk Police District is serviced by volunteer ambulance companies rather than a paid municipal service such as New York City Fire/EMS. The judgments made by the arriving police officer are crucial to the survival of individuals in need of medical attention. Often, these decisions have to be made in the interplay of emotions which accompany tragedy or violence. Plaintiffs-Appellants have argued herein that the cognitive abilities of the police applicant should be measured to ascertain their level of competence in dealing with complex factual situations.

          In the decision below, the court indicated that "...this assertion, that there is a necessary correlation between the minimization of cognitive factors and competent police officers is questionable, at best." (A. 173). The lower court further opined that "...the Court fails to see how action taken by a defendant to remedy that (disparate) impact, including the use of the testing scheme presently at issue, can violate the Tenth Amendment." (A. 172-73). This logic is faulty. It is akin to saying that no public safety issue is raised by firing wildly with a shotgun if one perceives it will remedy the ringing doorbell. A hearing may well have revealed to the court the dangerous potential of this lottery device for law enforcement selection. Instead, the court limited itself to a discussion of how Guardians, supra, "resolved" the argument. (A. 172). To the contrary, Guardians, supra, reinforced the need for a hearing on whether this selection device can be shown to have demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the job. In failing to conduct such a hearing, the court has failed to examine these allegations. The officer selected by this non-competitive device, much like the student in a failing school, may well be unable to function effectively when faced with both ordinary and crisis situations. Just by reading the newspapers one is well apprized of the numerous instances of alleged police misconduct in both Suffolk and Nassau Counties, as well as the Town of Wallkill, New York. Significantly, many jurisdictions are now utilizing similar examinations at a time when these and other police departments are undergoing tremendous scrutiny and criticism. The continuing imposition of this type of examination by the Department of Justice upon local police departments poses a serious and continuing danger to all citizens of this country, as there is a greater likelihood that police departments will hire incompetent police officers, who may abuse their authority. This will only further perpetuate community distrust of local law enforcement.




          "Noncompetitive examinations may readily be manipulated by the unscrupulous, with little likelihood of detection." Merlino v. Alan Schneider as Personnel Officer of the Suffolk County Department of Civil Service, 93 N.Y.2d 477, 693 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1999). The clear language of the Merlino court mandates that civil service examinations test abilities relevant to job qualification, or be predictive of job performance, and that they withstand meaningful scrutiny. The court's decision below is, therefore, inconsistent with the Court of Appeals decision in Merlino, and ignores New York States statutory and constitutional standards for design, implementation and grading for such examinations. The Court of Appeals has warned against such judicial indolence when it advised that without full disclosure and independent review, "the integrity of the entire civil service system is at risk." Mena v. D'Ambrose, 44 N.Y.2d 428, 433, 406 N.Y.S.2d 22, 24 (1978).

          The provisions of the State Constitution, statutes and rules requiring that appointments be made from among qualified people pursuant to competitive examination are intended to limit the group from which selection may be made to those who are qualified. Professional Clerical Technical Employees Association v. Buffalo Board of Education, 90 N.Y.2d 364, 660 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1999). The Court of Appeals addressing the concern that cronyism, rather than competence could determine who will fills civil service positions, held, "[t]he competitive examination is favored by the Constitution because it provides, presumably, and objective and verifiable measurement of the candidates' merit..." McGowan v. Burstein, 71 N.Y.2d 729, 733, 530 N.Y.S.2d 64, 66 (1988)(citations omitted). While the court in McGowan, permitted some degree of flexibility in testing candidates for civil service positions, the court's opinion cannot be construed as permitting an entirely subjective, non-cognitive selection device as the one in question.

          When the federal district court, as it did here, deferred entirely to the Executive Branch for oversight of a consent decree that waived state constitutional law as to a specific selection device, the risk in terms of allowing for adverse hiring procedures implemented by the agency is tremendous. In failing to safeguard state constitutional requirements, there is an abdication of the role of the federal courts to monitor possible overreaching by the Executive Branch.

          The opinion below in effect states that lowest common denominator ability is sufficient for civil service hiring. The New York State Constitution, New York Civil Service Law, Suffolk County Code, and the New York State Court of Appeals are to the contrary. The New York Supreme Court was prepared to review these matters in a hearing scheduled following the issuance of the temporary restraining order. After the Appellees removed the matter to the federal court, the federal court abdicated its role in ensuring that the civil service process was conducted fairly and legally.




          Veterans preferences rights are essential attributes of national citizenship. The Supreme Court has upheld the rights of indigent citizens to state benefits based upon their rights as national citizens under the privileges and immunities clause. Plaintiffs-Appellants contend that the government Appellees, by changing the standard for law enforcement selection from civil service based merit and fitness tests to a private corporation's random lottery selection device, have violated the rights of the combat era veterans (including Plaintiffs-Appellants Evans and Lloyd). The combat era veterans are entitled to five (5) preference points on a merit and fitness open and competitive examination under Section 50(6) of the New York Civil Service Law.

          The Appellees have made that right meaningless by changing the selection device to a lottery system. The federal courts must be constantly mindful of the special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and State administration of its own law. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976). As indicated above with regard to the separation of powers, a single federal administration's efforts to reduce the recognized value of combat military service by discarding state civil service laws honoring that combat service should be closely monitored and reviewed by the federal courts.

          The refusal of the courts to safeguard those rights calls into question the covenant between the nation and the citizen soldier. The refusal of the federal court to even follow the lead of the state court and schedule a hearing on the matter mandates reversal and direction to the court below to conduct meaningful review as to how and why these rights are being discarded.



          The District Court's decision in dismissing each and every one of Plaintiffs-Appellants' claims was premature as the court failed to conduct a full hearing on the merits of Plaintiff-Appellants' contentions. Thus, this Court should vacate the judgment of the District Court and the matter should be remanded for further proceedings, including appropriate discovery and a full hearing on all of Plaintiff-Appellants' claims.


1. New York State Constitution, Article V, Section 6, provides, "Appointments and promotions in the civil service of the state and all of the civil divisions thereof, including cities and villages, shall be made according to merit and fitness to be ascertained, as far as practicable, by examination which, as far as practicable, shall be competitive..." [Return to main text]

2. Section 50(6) of the New York Civil Service Law, provides, "Scope of examinations. Examinations shall be practical in their character and shall relate to those matters which will fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the persons examined to discharge the duties of that service into which they seek to be appointed..."  [Return to main text]

3. Section 580-1(A) of the Suffolk County Code, provides, "The purpose of these rules is to provide an orderly and uniform system for the administration of civil service in the County of Suffolk on the basis of merit and fitness as provided in Article V, Section 6 of the New York State Constitution, the Suffolk County Charter and the Civil Service Law of the State of New York...."  [Return to main text]

Additional Background and Info:

The federal Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (Recommended)

Judge Derails Hiring of Cops in Suffolk County (05/19/00)

The Role of Minority / Quota Consultant SHL Landy Jacobs

END Case 21: (3) Suffolk County - Appeal by Plaintiffs


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*  We use the term reverse discrimination reluctantly and only because it is so widely understood.  In our opinion there really is only one kind of discrimination.